2Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions
THE PUZZLEWhat explains the patterns of world politics? Why do interests, interactions, and institutions matter in international relations?
Above: China’s naval maneuvers in the South China Sea have led to confrontations with neighboring states over competing claims to the sea and the resources within it. States’ interests in power and wealth often bring them into conflicts that lead to bargaining over how to divide objects of value, such as territory. Although an international court has ruled that China’s expansive claims in this region are unjustified, international institutions have only limited ability to resolve these disputes.
On April 2, 2020, a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating in the South China Sea collided with a Chinese surveillance ship and sank. All eight fishermen on board were rescued and transferred to another Vietnamese boat, but the incident sparked a diplomatic storm in the region and beyond. Vietnam lodged an official protest with the United Nations (UN), claiming that the Chinese ship rammed the boat as it was fishing in Vietnamese waters around the Paracel Islands. China, which claims the same collection of coral islands and reefs and calls them the Xisha Islands, accused the men of illegally fishing in Chinese waters and said that the collision was due to reckless maneuvers on the Vietnamese side. The Philippine government joined Vietnam in protesting the sinking of the vessel, recalling that its own fishermen had faced similar harassment in waters disputed with China.
A few weeks later, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo condemned the incident in an address to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), calling it part of a pattern of “continuing provocative behavior.”1 Beijing reacted angrily to the criticism, declaring that it was prepared to take “all necessary measures to firmly safeguard its sovereignty, rights and interests in the South China Sea.”2 Around the same time, Chinese vessels began patrolling around a ship authorized by the Malaysian government to survey for oil and gas in waters claimed by both countries. U.S. warships, already in the region conducting exercises, moved in to protect the Malaysian ship, which left the area peacefully after completing its task.3
These were not the first maritime standoffs in this region, which has been the subject of competing claims since the 1930s. But the escalating tensions came at a particularly fraught moment in relations between China and the United States. Pompeo charged that Beijing was seeking to extend its control of the contested sea while other countries were preoccupied with the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time, the disease was contained in China but still spreading rapidly around the globe and in the United States. Indeed, anti-Chinese rhetoric went on to play a large role in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, as President Donald Trump sought to deflect anger at the virus’s death toll away from his administration.
But even before the pandemic, the United States and China were on a collision course. The two countries have had tense relations since 1949, when communists prevailed in China’s long-running civil war and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The PRC became a major adversary during the early Cold War, intervening against U.S. forces in the Korean War (1950–53), supporting communist North Vietnam in the Vietnam War (1965–73), and sparking crises with Taiwan, where Nationalist Chinese forces allied with the United States had fled after 1949.
The more recent rivalry, however, has its roots in China’s impressive economic growth over the last 40 years, which has propelled it to become the world’s second-largest economy. This growth has fueled an increase in military spending, which has greatly improved the quality and quantity of China’s military force. Since the 1990s, when projections started showing that China’s economy would surpass that of the United States in the mid-2000s, U.S. foreign policy has grappled with the “rise of China” and the question of how to manage the threat China poses to U.S. global leadership.
The United States’ initial response to China’s rise was a policy known as “engagement,” which sought to bring China into the U.S.-led international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The hope was that as China came to play a larger role in these institutions, it would have a stake in their success and become a partner with the United States, rather than a competitor.
By the time President Trump came into office in 2016, these hopes were waning. China’s behavior in the South China Sea had become more aggressive, not less. President Xi Jinping, who came into office in 2012, embarked on a project of “national revival,” including a more ambitious foreign policy that seeks to expand Chinese global influence and crack down on domestic dissent.
In response, the United States has taken a number of actions designed to counter China’s ambitions and reverse the integration of the two countries’ economies. On the military side, the United States has maintained alliances with South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines while pursuing closer partnerships with other countries in the region, including India and Vietnam. President Trump, who had labeled China an “economic enemy” during the 2016 campaign, imposed tariffs to compel China to purchase more U.S. exports. The resulting trade war threatened a decoupling of the two countries’ economies, a process that the COVID-19 pandemic could accelerate.
These events lead us to consider several questions. Why has China’s rise led to increasing tensions with the United States? What do they hope to achieve through maritime confrontations with fishing boats and survey ships? What role can institutions like the UN, ASEAN, and the WTO play in helping ensure that these conflicts do not escalate to war and/or disrupt global economic relations?
Thinking Analytically about Interests, Interactions, and Institutions
We study international relations in order to gain insight into such questions of conflict and cooperation. We seek to understand why states and their leaders make certain choices and why we observe certain outcomes. To help in our task, this chapter takes a closer look at three core concepts that enable us to think analytically about world politics: interests, interactions, and institutions.
Interests are the fundamental building blocks of politics. Explanations of international political events begin by specifying the relevant actors (such as China or the president of the United States) and their interests (such as power, security, or wealth). As actors pursue their interests, they interact with other actors; the nature of these interactions affects the outcomes and whether actors can get what they want. Institutions (such as the UN, WTO, and ASEAN) may also influence the outcomes of interactions by providing rules that facilitate cooperation. This framework can be used to analyze and understand not only the growing tensions between the United States and China but also the puzzles described in the chapters that follow and, equally important, others that will arise in the future.
Endnotes
Sofia Tomacruz, “Pompeo Urges ASEAN to Call Out Beijing’s Moves in South China Sea during Pandemic,” Rappler, April 23, 2020, www.rappler.com/nation/258824-us-urges-countries-oppose-china-moves-south-china-sea-coronavirus-pandemic (accessed 10/21/20). Return to reference 1
Associated Press, “Recent Developments Surrounding the South China Sea,” ABC News, April 26, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/recent-developments-surrounding-south-china-sea-70356913 (accessed 10/21/20). Return to reference 2
Niharika Mandhana, “U.S. Warships Support Malaysia against China Pressure in South China Sea, Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sends-warships-to-support-malaysia-in-south-china-sea-amid-china-pressure-11589382717 (accessed 10/21/20). Return to reference 3
